When J. William Fulbright (D-AR) chaired the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959 to 1974, he was an exacting critic of American policies in the Middle East, especially America’s relationship with Israel. Members of the small Arkansas Jewish community disapproved of Fulbright’s assertions that the American Jewish community and Israel dictated Middle East foreign policies. Historians have not addressed the question of whether or not southern Jews influenced their representatives. This essay offers a case study of a United States senator from Arkansas, of his position on Israel, an issue of critical interest to Jews, of his opposition to what he perceived as an all-powerful Jewish/Israeli lobby, and of local Jewish responses.

Arkansas’s Jewish Community

Few Jews lived in Fayetteville, a town in the southern foothills of the Ozark Mountains in northwestern Arkansas, when Fulbright, who was born in 1905, was growing up in an affluent area of the town. By the time that Fulbright was in his teens, only two Jewish families, both merchants, lived in Fayetteville. An economics professor and well-regarded legal scholar, Julian Waterman, began teaching at the University of Arkansas’s flagship campus in Fayetteville in 1914. In his formative years,
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Fulbright’s relationship with Jews was limited. Ironically, given the charges of antisemitism that were later levied against him, it was Waterman’s own perceptions of antisemitism that may have helped Fulbright secure his first prominent position. In 1939 the University of Arkansas faculty preferred that Waterman, by then dean of the law school, be appointed president of the university. Waterman, according to Fulbright, refused the trustee’s offer because “he felt that as a Jew he would be subject to prejudice which was much worse in those days.” Others in Fayetteville, including Waterman’s wife and a family friend, believed that the university trustees never offered the position to him. They conjectured that the university’s failure to offer the position greatly saddened him. Fulbright believed that Waterman recommended that the future senator be appointed president, a position he held until he was terminated two years later by the newly elected state governor. Waterman was named vice-president. Although Fulbright was shunned in the university community after removal from the presidency, Waterman was one of those who remained loyal to him. Not until the 1960s, when Fulbright spent little time in Fayetteville, did Jews arrive in the area in larger numbers as managers of the rapidly developing industry or as professors at the university. But even then, the Jewish community remained small.1

During Fulbright’s tenure as a national politician, the center of Arkansas’s Jewish community was Little Rock, the state capital, where the community of approximately fourteen hundred had been a substantial presence in the business and professional realm for decades. Their income, social position, and role in civic affairs relied on their connections with the white gentile majority.

During the early 1950s, a distinct increase in antisemitic literature connected the civil rights movement with a Soviet-Communist-Zionist conspiracy. With notable exceptions, Little Rock Jews, fearful for their livelihoods, did not challenge the segregationist southern tradition. Some southern rabbis and a few other Jews provided leadership in the civil rights struggle, sometimes even jeopardizing southern Jews. Nevertheless, the level of engagement in civil rights did not determine whether or not a
(Courtesy of J. William Fulbright Papers,
Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.)
synagogue would be bombed or threatened with bombing. In Little Rock, Rabbi Ira E. Sanders led the quest for racial justice. The members of his Reform congregation, B’nai Israel, the largest in Little Rock, supported his activities. Although most Little Rock Jews sent their children to suburban high schools, about sixty-five Reform Jewish women in the city rendered a significant civil rights service in the controversy over the 1957 desegregation of Central High School. Although they had to relinquish public leadership roles to avoid antisemitic repercussions, they were particularly active in the Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools after the public schools were closed in the aftermath of the altercations at the high school. Worried about boycotts of their businesses and professional offices, their husbands remained silent. A majority of the Jewish community viewed civil rights activism as reckless.2

Ironically, a southern Jew helped shape and clarify Fulbright’s views on race in the South in the 1950s. A millionaire department store owner from Mississippi and an accomplished writer about the American South, David Cohn became a trusted Fulbright aide. In 1944, he wrote that any attempt to change “the social segregation of the races” by law would lead to violence. Although the problem was “incapable of solution,” and “the issue of segregation must not be called into question,” the “Negro question,” except for “social segregation” might “be gradually adjusted or removed through the exercise of patience, wisdom, and good will on both sides.” Fulbright’s stance on civil rights reflected these views. By 1957, he favored peaceful school integration and was embarrassed by the ridicule the confrontation brought to Arkansas. Yet, he remained silent until 1957, when he filed an amicus curiae brief with the United States Supreme Court on behalf of the Little Rock school board that called for delay, the essence of Cohn’s stand.3 Sanders and Fulbright may have wanted the same outcome, but their motives differed. Sanders was genuinely concerned about the difficulties that African Americans faced in Little Rock, while Fulbright focused on the national and international image of the state he represented.
On the subject of Israel, however, Arkansas’s Jewish community was more united. As will be seen, the small, but influential, Little Rock community made repeated and unsuccessful attempts to elicit Fulbright’s support on Israel’s behalf.\textsuperscript{4}

\textit{Julian Waterman.}

\textit{(Courtesy of the J. William Fulbright Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.)}
J. William Fulbright and Middle East Foreign Policy

Foreign affairs defined Fulbright’s political career. Even after he left the Senate, Fulbright continued his keen interest in foreign policy into the 1990s. The focus here is on his approach to the Middle East, during a period in which the United States was determined to keep the politically and militarily unstable region within the American security and economic sphere of influence, while denying access to the Soviet Union.

At Oxford University, where Fulbright studied as a Rhodes Scholar, he savored the intellectual atmosphere, so different from his native Fayetteville. Oxford was markedly unlike the University of Arkansas, with its emphasis on agriculture, where he studied as an undergraduate. He acquired a strong interest in foreign affairs through extensive travel in Europe and Asia. While he continued to represent a southern state, this interest informed his career in national politics. Some congressional colleagues would resent his air of certitude about foreign policy and his inclination to lecture.5

Elected to the House of Representatives in 1942, Fulbright became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, where he displayed an internationalist outlook. The single House term was best represented by his introduction in 1943 of what is known as the Fulbright Resolution, an appeal for American membership in a postwar collective security organization. After his election to the Senate in 1944, he originated the international scholar and cultural exchange program that bears his name.

Once Fulbright joined the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, committee hearings, numerous speeches, and articles he wrote for popular and scholarly publications provided him forums for his opinions. From his perspective, although Congress was not prepared to manage the administrative details of foreign policy-making generally handled by the White House, Congress did play a constructive role in formulating solutions to long-range problems including those in foreign policy. Not only could Congress serve as a debating forum, he thought it should also introduce new proposals, while serving as a platform to launch
and debate new directions. In his role as a dissenter on foreign policy matters, such as the war in Vietnam and American policies in the Middle East, Fulbright was able to use his influential post to affect public discourse. The notice he drew from his forceful opposition to American involvement in Vietnam provided him with the prominence to draw attention to other foreign policy matters of intense concern for him.

A highly regarded voice in the foreign policy field, Fulbright held complex and often contradictory convictions. Initially a dedicated liberal internationalist, he would become an opponent of American commitments abroad. After World War II he assailed presidential use of foreign policy prerogatives and contended that American overseas commitments were too far-reaching. While not an isolationist, Fulbright now argued for a careful balance of obligations abroad. Support for Israel’s survival should not be the same as open-ended backing of the foreign policy actions of the Israeli government, where, from his perspective, they conflicted with American national interests.

The Zionist notion of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East won early support on Capitol Hill. Congress unanimously supported the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British promise of free immigration and a homeland for Jews in Palestine, part of the Ottoman Empire granted to Great Britain at the conclusion of World War I. The Democratic and Republican Party platforms also reflected this sentiment beginning in 1944, when they included planks favoring a Jewish homeland. By passing pro-Zionist resolutions and sending letters to the White House, Congress played a role in the formation of American policies toward a future Zionist state. However, this limited aid was restricted by the constitutional foreign policy powers reserved to the executive branch, made more powerful by White House assertions of its foreign policy prerogatives especially in the postwar period. Congress played a constraining or modulating role, but ultimately did not determine policy. Fulbright thought that United States policies had become subservient to Israeli demands and was determined to use congressional authority to alter America’s relationship with Israel.
Fulbright’s scrutiny raised central questions during a period when the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations reevaluated and fundamentally transformed the American relationship with Israel and the Arab countries. In addition to apprehensions about Soviet attempts to bring the Arab nations, especially Egypt, into the Soviet orbit, the United States wished to promote regional security as well as avert an arms race and the possibility of nuclear proliferation in this unstable region. Ensuring Western access to the substantial Middle East oil reserves always remained a prominent and urgent priority.

Middle East policies were intertwined with the cold war. While Fulbright’s views about Israel would remain consistent, his attitude toward the Soviet Union evolved. In the immediate post-World War II period, he was a strident cold war internationalist, supporting increased presidential powers to use American power and influence to contain the Soviet Union, which he viewed as the patron of every revolutionary movement.

In 1959 when Fulbright assumed the Foreign Policy Committee chairmanship, American policy toward Israel was in flux. Safeguarding American economic and security interests in the region and unspecified assurances to safeguard Israeli independence remained the only constants. Although the Truman administration recognized the new state of Israel in 1948, it embargoed arms shipments when Israel came under siege from its Arab neighbors. The Eisenhower administration continued this precedent of refusing the sale of armaments to Israel, a void filled by France and England. The Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1954, recognizing that it had nothing to gain from Zionism, that Israel was in the American camp. Moscow then sought closer ties with the Arab states, especially those close to its vulnerable southern border. Meanwhile, American Middle East strategy was also designed to improve relations with the Arab states. Jewish groups, making their first attempts to unite into a political force in support of Israel, were still largely ineffective and had little influence in the Eisenhower administration. In the 1956 Suez crisis, the administration aligned with the Soviet Union to censure Israel’s participation in the assault on the canal
zone. The administration objective was to keep Israel at a distance, primarily due to concerns about an Arab-Soviet alliance and Western access to oil. The Kennedy administration modified this stance by selling Hawk defensive weapon systems to Israel, as well as assuring Israel of American assistance if the Arab nations invaded.8

A decisive policy change followed. The Johnson administration sold tanks and other military hardware to Israel that it justified as defensive in nature, although A-1 Skyhawk attack aircraft, F-4 Phantom jet fighters, and Patton M-48 tanks, which
could easily be modified to be virtually identical to the newer American M-60 tanks, were offensive weapons. Johnson acknowledged “a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people,” and enjoyed close ties with American Jews. After Israel’s decisive military victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day’s War, America replaced France as the major supplier of sophisticated military equipment to Israel, and American support for Israel expanded significantly. The regional balancing act tilted toward Israel, and a patron-client relationship solidified and reinforced the relationship between the two nations. The Yom Kippur War in October 1973, in which Israel struggled to recover from a surprise Egyptian and Syrian attack, gave the Nixon administration the opportunity to reassert American leverage in the region and undermine Soviet influence, at the same time that it deferred for future peace settlements the complicated issue of the rights of the Palestinian people displaced in this conflict.9

Until 1974 because of his powerful Senate committee chairmanship, Fulbright’s objections compelled successive administrations, American Jews, and the Israeli government to respond to his charges, even when he could not alter administration decisions. In 1969, for example, he complained to Secretary of State William P. Rogers about the planned transfer of Joseph C. Sisco from his post as a United States representative to the United Nations to a position as Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the State Department. He thought the move would offend Arabs, who perceived Sisco as demonstrating “a very strong bias in favor of Israel,” a charge that would complicate peace efforts in the Middle East. Fulbright’s prediction was mistaken. Sisco tried to persuade Israel to withdraw from the territory it acquired in the 1967 War, while he aimed to convince Arab nations that the United States sought to be evenhanded.10

Lobbying and United States-Israeli Relations

Especially in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel in 1948, American Jews focused on the development of American foreign policy toward the Middle East. This well-educated, relatively small ethnic group, less than 3 per-
cent of the population, disproportionately participated in politics as voters, activists, and generous contributors to candidates, political parties, and special-interest organizations. A relatively united post-state American Zionist movement developed over time and sporadically. Government-sponsored violent antisemitism in Europe and disclosure of the horrors of the Holocaust weakened American Jewish opposition to Zionism and the position of such groups as the American Council for Judaism, the only Jewish organization whose primary purpose was opposition to Zionism. The organization retained some influence with the Eisenhower administration, but that access faded in the Kennedy administration. After the 1967 War, anti-Zionism among Jews generally ceased. In judging political candidates and the decisions of policy makers, many Jews vigilantly monitored perceived threats to Israel’s survival and lobbied to counteract such actions. Support for Israel’s security and welfare informed their voting behavior. Concentrated in pivotal electoral states, they could influence the outcome of a close election. These politically interested people and numerous Jewish organizations exerted an indirect influence on policy, one that continually irritated Fulbright.11

In 1954, American Jewish leaders, concerned about what they considered the pro-Arab leaning of the State Department and the indifference of the Eisenhower administration, organized the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), under the leadership of I. L. Kenen, as the only official American lobbying group for Israel. Although Kenen stressed that the AZCPA was not an agent of a foreign government, the informal relationship was substantial, a point not lost on Fulbright. Reorganized in 1959 as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as a domestic lobby, the organization increased its effectiveness in associating American national interests with those of Israel. Because AZCPA had come under scrutiny as an agent of a foreign government, AIPAC argued that it represented the American Jewish community and had no official relationship with the Israeli government.12 Fulbright was aware of the close connection between AIPAC and the Israeli government.
Had these interest groups not emerged and gained strength in the 1950s and 1960s, the American response to Israeli requests for financial and military assistance may not have been as substantial. Members of Congress were responsive to their financial and electoral influence. Campaign contributions, as well as research analysis and assistance, could and did affect congressional foreign aid allocations. AIPAC experienced more success lobbying Congress than the White House, where it had less access. Congressional support for Israel’s requests transcended regional and party divisions. Not all of Israel’s supporters represented areas with large Jewish populations. AIPAC staff members monitored congressional debates, constantly mindful of problems as well as opportunities to garner support. The organization became alarmed, for example, in 1969, when Secretary of State William Rogers proposed a plan for Israel to withdraw from the lands it acquired in the 1967 war. AIPAC persuaded a majority in Congress to pass resolutions opposing the measure. Although other factors, such as an Egyptian military buildup and Soviet involvement in the region, persuaded the administration not to pursue the Rogers Plan, solid congressional support for Israel was persuasive, especially as a political gauge of public support for Israel. AIPAC also assisted congressional staffs with current and relevant material about the region from a pro-Israel perspective through Near East Report, a weekly newsletter, and the research papers and memoranda it sent to members of Congress, as well as to other policy and opinion makers. Furthermore, AIPAC effectively used a communications network of letters, telegrams, and telephone calls to grass roots supporters and other Jewish organizations, asking them to contact members of Congress. One of those organizations, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, formed in 1954 by thirty-eight constituent organizations, provided a prominent voice for all of its members. The main contact between the executive branch and the Jewish community, it served as a liaison between its constituents and the White House, although it was less effective than AIPAC in influencing foreign policy. AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents were the only two pro-Israel registered domestic lobbies.
While Jewish lobbying groups did not create the perception that Israel was a reliable if not always a cooperative and compliant strategic and security asset in the American competition with the Soviets in the Middle East, they employed this impression to their advantage. Fulbright, who supported the Rogers Plan, did not heed the advice of his Jewish constituents. The spiritual leader of the Orthodox congregation in Little Rock, along with members of the congregation, implored Fulbright to speak out against “the grave harm and injustice implicit” in Rogers’ proposal, which they perceived as “the consequence of yielding to hard-line Soviet-Arab demands.”
The early cold war period unfolded as a critical time in the development of United States-Israel relations. Early on, Fulbright directed his attention to the role of special interest groups in forming foreign policy, particularly on what he considered undue American Jewish and Israeli influence on America’s role in the Middle East. Although he endorsed the Truman administration’s decision to recognize Israel and acknowledged Israel’s precarious strategic situation, his repeated requests for what he perceived to be a balanced approach to the region earned him a reputation for being anti-Israel and pro-Arab. In the 1950s, Fulbright used committee hearings to confront Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, criticizing him for being insufficiently concerned about Soviet ambitions in the region. Withdrawing American aid to Egypt for the Aswan Dam project he thought would allow the Soviets to exploit this issue in the Arab world. In 1959, he related to a fellow senator, he had “thought for some time that we should be friendly toward [Egyptian President Gamal] Nasser.” He insisted that these perceptions were mistaken, that he did not conceive of himself “as being pro-Arab or anti-Israel, but rather pro-American.”

In the early 1960s Fulbright turned his attention to the sizable annual congressional subsidy to Israel, a persistent interest that expanded throughout his tenure in the Senate. The imbalance between aid to Israel and to the Arab states troubled him. For example, in the postwar period between 1948 and 1954 American foreign aid to Israel amounted to $341 million, in contrast to $12 million to Egypt. In the second Eisenhower administration and in the Kennedy administration, between 1958 and 1964, $165,996 was appropriated to Israel, while just $65,700 was allocated to the United Arab Republic (a union of Egypt and Syria). Under the Johnson administration, in 1969 alone aid to Israel amounted to $40 million, while aid to the United Arab Republic dropped to $4 million. Fulbright criticized Israeli policies and denounced the strategies of Israel’s organized American Jewish supporters. He argued that Americans had “allowed themselves to be drawn to the Israeli side by bonds of sympathy and by the impact of the most powerful and efficient foreign policy lobby in American
politics.” These “sentimental and cultural bonds” misled American policy makers to “rationalize our involvement in terms of geopolitical metaphors.”

Fulbright thought that settling the Arab-Israel dispute would moderate the cold war, which extended to the Middle East during the mid-1950s. Continuing American interest in the region was now assured, since limiting the Soviet sphere of influence was an essential component of the containment policy. Furthermore, another possible source of contention was added to the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. As with the war in Vietnam, he worried that the situation in the Middle East could lead to a nuclear war. In his search for forces that impeded an Arab-Israeli settlement, he centered on the Israeli government and its American Jewish supporters. Fulbright was determined that long-term American national interests be paramount when Israeli and Arab interests were considered. In numerous committee hearings and in his writings, he focused on this issue. While he recognized Israel’s security concerns, he frequently alleged undue congressional support for Israel and what he considered Israeli manipulation of American policies in the Middle East. In the forward to a book that Seth Tillman, his speechwriter, wrote about the Middle East conflict, Fulbright blamed these groups for the American government’s failure to use its financial and political power over Israel to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement. He worried that the international community regarded the United States as “responsible for Israeli policy and as the only power which has the capacity to influence that policy.” This overstatement reflects Fulbright’s superficial understanding of this patron-client relationship and the intricacies of the Middle East conflict. He believed that support for Israel was the consequence of domestic politics, while disregarding considerations of balance of power and cold war issues, as well as the need for a reliable strategic ally.

Israel’s supporters perceived these critiques as evidence of antisemitism. The charges remained a sensitive issue for the senator. In response to a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Fulbright’s press secretary quoted Fulbright as saying that it was not “fair or accurate to categorize [his] position as anti-Israel,”
since he sought “a more balanced policy in the Middle East.” Overall, these were not the tirades of an antisemite or one who hated Israel, but expressions of indignation about what he considered the subordination of American national interests in favor of those of Israel, as well as anxiety about the possibility of a confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Fulbright maintained that he understood why memories of the Nazi Holocaust and Arab “talk about ‘holy wars’ and about throwing the Jews in the sea” made Israel “preoccupied with its survival.” While he conceded that the “Israeli conviction of Arab hostility is by no means invention,” he insisted, without proof, that there was “a touch of paranoia about it.”

Friction grew heated in 1963, as Fulbright directed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to conduct hearings to investigate the Jewish Agency, a registered agent of the Israeli government highly successful in raising funds from wealthy American supporters. He accused the organization of channeling funds through the American Zionist Council to establish a favorable climate of public opinion for Israel in the United States. Specifically he alleged that it used more than $5 million dollars in tax-free donations to the philanthropic United Jewish Appeal, which were recycled back from Israel, then disbursed through “conduits” of the Jewish Agency’s American section to shape American opinion and modify United States policies. Fulbright relentlessly reprimanded the B’nai B’rith and AIPAC for activities that Fulbright considered abuses and which by the 1960s had become considerably effective in promoting pro-Israeli legislation in Congress. Although the Kennedy White House, concerned about adverse publicity in the Jewish community as it planned for the 1964 election campaign, attempted to suppress the hearings findings, Fulbright insisted on releasing them. As a result the Foreign Agents Registration Act was amended to regulate the political activities of foreign agents. As an American organization, AIPAC would be exempt. By 1961 and the American sponsored invasion of the Bay of Pigs, Fulbright began to have serious questions concerning the malicious nature of Soviet motives. By the mid-1960s he saw possibilities in working with the Soviets to solve the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors signaled for Fulbright the possibility that plans for easing cold war tensions would unravel.

In 1967 Israel faced both a massive Arab military buildup and Egypt’s blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran to ships bound to and from the southern Israeli port of Eilat. The port, Israel’s only access to the south, was a vital trade outlet to the Indian Ocean through which Israel received much of its shipping from Africa and Asia. Meanwhile Palestine Liberation Organization fighters in Syria, Lebanon, and the Sinai Peninsula attacked Israeli border towns. In response to these provocations, Israel launched a preemptive strike against its Arab neighbors. Just days before the outbreak of hostilities, Fulbright, a firm supporter of collective security, contended in an NBC *Meet the Press* interview that to avoid a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over tensions in the Middle East, the crisis should be submitted to the United Nations Security Council because Israel was “the creation of the United Nations.” An outbreak of hostilities “could become a hot war as has been going on in the Far East,” a reference to the war in Vietnam.23

Israel’s overwhelming victory, one that doubled the nation’s size at the expense of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, by bringing East Jerusalem, the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights under Israeli control, resulted in persisting tensions in the region. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967, calling for Israel to relinquish these lands in return for recognition from the Arab states, was a vaguely worded document about which the two sides could not agree. Fulbright incessantly advised American policy-makers to induce Israel to relinquish these Arab lands. In part, this stand reflected concern about appeasing oil producers in the region and, in part, indicated his movement away from internationalism. These oil producers were “basically friendly to the United States,” and it would be unsuitable “to involve ourselves as partisans in a quarrel between foreign states that has no direct bearing on the United States.” He later characterized Israel’s failure to follow his advice, especially its refusal to negotiate the
status of East Jerusalem, as lacking in “flexibility and foresight.” Fulbright recommended that Jerusalem be internationalized. While support for Israeli policies shifted, for example, under the Carter administration, Congress and the White House would not concur with Fulbright that the land dispute component of the Arab-Israeli conflict did not directly involve United States interests.

Fulbright concentrated his attention on the potential military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as tension mounted over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the almost simultaneous escalation of the war in Vietnam. Instead of authorizing additional military assistance to Israel, Fulbright claimed that the United States could better serve Israel by promoting a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Providing additional aircraft would “lead to greater Egyptian dependence upon the Soviet Union and thus bring us one step closer to a dangerous and unnecessary confrontation with the Soviets.”

In 1970 he argued that the Soviets recognized the folly of continued rivalry and acknowledged that their interests corresponded with those of the United States in the region. Each had been manipulated by their client states—the Americans by Israel and the Soviets by the Arab nations. In 1970 the former cold war warrior concluded that in light of the Soviet Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the United States, the Soviet Union could become a partner in bringing peace to the Middle East. After criticizing Israel’s policies toward its Arab neighbors and the Palestinian people who occupied the land that Israel captured in the Six-Day War, Fulbright made a surprise recommendation for a United Nations Security Council guarantee, with Russian support, to assure Israel’s security. In return, Israel would withdraw to its pre-1967 borders, agree not to violate those borders, and compensate Palestinian refugees displaced in the series of wars since 1948. For Israel, such a guarantee could not replace a treaty with all of the Arab states that recognized Israel, including the territories acquired in the 1967 War. In an exchange with Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), Fulbright declared that United Nations Resolution 242 to be “still the most complete, impartial, and generally accepted policy statement for a Middle
East settlement.” Ribicoff, a Jew and generally a supporter of Israel, was not convinced. Fulbright later modified his withdrawal blueprint to allow Israel to retain the Golan Heights and Jordan Valley for security reasons. If lack of confidence in the United Nations were to jeopardize this guarantee, Fulbright made an extraordinary recommendation for a bilateral United States guarantee to Israel. When reporters pointed out that this plan deviated from his opposition to American commitments abroad, he contended that his objection pertained to commitments not formally submitted to the Senate. A treaty with Israel would have to be ratified. Fulbright thought a formal guarantee, in accordance with United Nations Resolution 242, might contribute to political stability in the area because he believed “the status quo was not in the long-term interest of the United States or Israel.” His suggestion for a treaty “was intended to provide further assurance to Israel” of its security because he knew Israel had reservations “about depending solely on a U.N. agreement.” The guarantee was restricted because it would not allow for “American troops to fight in the Middle East.” In addition, such a commitment to Israel had to be balanced “with justice for the Arabs and the national interests of the United States.”

Although Israel had requested a mutual security treaty in the past, no administration had taken such a bold step.

Israel and its American Jewish supporters found these conditions unacceptable. Fulbright’s reliance on collaboration between the United States and the United Nations recalled his post-World War II faith in multilateralism. He failed to comprehend Israel’s aversion to and distrust of a possible solution based on “the stationing of sizable United Nations forces in military neutralized zones on both sides of the border at all of the points which are critical to Israel’s security.” He also dismissed Israel’s aversion to involving the Soviet Union, which had supported Arab nations since the mid-1950s. For the former cold war warrior, Soviet attempts “to maximize their influence in the Arab world” was “normal behavior for a great power,” and Israel was employing “Communist-baiting humbuggery” to “manipulate” American
policy in the Middle East. He decried America’s willingness to “permit client states like Israel and South Vietnam to manipulate American policy toward purposes contrary to our interest.” Fulbright would later characterize the United States as a “crippled giant . . . highly susceptible” to these anti-communism manipulations, “rather like a drug addict” in a world “full of ideological ‘pushers.’”29 This appeal for selectivity of commitments was indicative of his movement away from promoting open-ended responsibilities characteristic of his earlier cold war stances.

Several political leaders took advantage of the outcry from American Jews over Fulbright’s statements. For example, Repre-
sentative Gerald R. Ford (R-MI), known as a friend of Israel, told an AIPAC luncheon gathering of 150 House members and 250 Jewish leaders that Fulbright, “a self-proclaimed peace advocate, has undermined prospects of a real Arab-Israeli settlement by tacitly encouraging the Soviet Union and Arab extremists to desist from a genuine peace and to continue a great military escalation in the hopes of forcing their will upon Israel.” His comments in support of Israel drew repeated applause, while his allusion to Fulbright met with hisses.30

When Egypt and its Arab neighbors attacked Israel in October 1973 in the Yom Kippur War, Israel appealed to the United States for military supplies and equipment. Even before this attack Fulbright predicted Arab retaliation for the 1967 war, and he viewed the Israeli military position as precarious. He urged Israel to “negotiate a political settlement . . . and not wait for the situation to deteriorate.” After initial delays over concerns about Soviet military aid to Egypt, the Nixon administration airlifted the requested assistance. This sale led to an Arab oil embargo, which Fulbright attributed to continued sales of American military equipment to Israel. AIPAC took the lead in lobbying on Israel’s behalf. Subsequent swift passage of a $2.2 billion arms and aid package to resupply Israel after the war partly reflected AIPAC’s vigilant effort to educate members of Congress to the gravity of the crisis. This aid package outraged Fulbright.31

When asked in a CBS television Face the Nation interview if King Faisal of Saudi Arabia were to refuse to increase oil production unless the United States modified its policy toward Israel, would Fulbright advocate modifications in United States policy, he answered: “I would.” A few years later, he argued that access to oil was a “vital [italics in original] interest, whereas our commitment to Israel is a less-than-vital interest.” Although the “all-out supporters of current Israeli policy in Congress” were “well aware of this priority of interests, [only] by denying the connection can support of Israeli policy be given precedence over our national energy requirements.” He did not believe it “necessary to sacrifice oil to Israel, or Israel to oil.” An “equitable settlement” could “assure the survival and security of Israel and also solidify
our good political and economic relations with the Arab countries.” A “reasonable” settlement must allow for “self-determination by the Palestinian people,” as well as “the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories now occupied by Israel.” It must include “restitution for the Palestinian people, forcibly expelled from their homes and country . . . just as the Jewish people were deserving of restitution after World War II.” Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “step-by-step” disengagement agreements, while “admirable,” did “not deal with the central, crucial issues.” A conference should be convened in Geneva, co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union, to negotiate a “general settlement based on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, self-determination of the Palestinian people, and a special status for Jerusalem, all under the guarantee of the great powers as members of the Security Council of the United Nations.” Because the United States “made it possible for Israel to exist as a state,” it was “not too much to ask in return that Israel give up East Jerusalem and the West Bank.” He predicted that these concessions would result in lower oil prices. The United States would have to “accept the Russians as full partners in the making and guarantee of a Middle East peace; and the Israelis must accept the Palestinians, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as negotiating partners with a right to form a state of their own.”32 In 1977, a Carter administration proposal for such a conference would come under fire from Israel. Its supporters were unwilling to permit representation by the PLO and opposed bringing the Soviet Union into the peace process.33 The conference was not held.

Accusations of undue Jewish congressional leverage put Fulbright at distinct odds with influential senatorial colleagues, whom he accused of doing all they could “to encourage the Israelis,” instead of playing a “constructive role.” In 1973 he announced in a Face the Nation interview that a Zionist lobby entirely in control of Congress would not permit the United States to work with the Russians to curb the flow of arms to the Arabs and Israelis, repeating an observation he had been making since the 1960s. Only collective action under the United Nations held any
hope of change. The United States lacked “leverage” over Israel, although it received American funding, because “Israel controls the Senate.” When moderator George Herman observed that this was “a fairly serious charge,” Fulbright responded that he was simply stating the facts. As evidence he pointed to an amendment to a Soviet trade bill, offered by an ardent cold war warrior, Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), that would prohibit the Soviet Union from receiving most-favored-nation trade status until it permitted unfettered Russian Jewish emigration to Israel, legislation the Nixon administration fervently opposed as detrimental to détente. The two senators, with markedly dissimilar views of the Soviet Union, waged an acrimonious verbal battle. Fulbright told a national television audience that “on every test on everything the Israelis are interested in the Senate . . . the Israelis have 75 to 80 votes.” When challenged on these figures, he responded that it was not “in any way an overstatement.” These senators “believe in the policies of the present government of Israel.” Fulbright believed “that Israel’s long-term security and survival” depended “upon a settlement of her ongoing war with her neighbors.” He also alleged that the legislation “only served to set back the trends toward better Soviet-American relations.” Congress was guilty of “nearly allow[ing] our détente with the Soviet Union to go on the rocks in order to obtain an agreement on large-scale Jewish emigration—a matter of limited relevance to the basic issue of human rights in the Soviet Union and of no relevance at all to the vital interests of the United States.”

This attack on Jackson and the assertion that Israel controlled the Senate brought a stinging rebuke from Rabbi Elijah E. Palnick, who succeeded Sanders as spiritual leader of Temple B’nai Israel in Little Rock. In an open letter, Palnick described Fulbright as “petty, petulant, and even slanderous” in attacking those with whom he disagreed. This was a “low blow, in bad taste.” Fulbright responded that he appreciated the liberal Palnick’s support of his opposition to the war in Vietnam and “it distresses [him] very much” that Palnick felt his judgment was “erroneous in the present crisis.” The “issues involved in the Middle East and the security of Israel” were so complicated that Fulbright preferred to
discuss them in person the next time the senator returned to Little Rock. Philip G. Back, Arkansas chairman of Bonds for Israel, told reporters that the Arkansas Jewish community “uniformly disliked” Fulbright’s charge, and he wondered if Fulbright was a “friend of the Jewish community.”

Certain of another, probably devastating, Arab-Israeli war, Fulbright intensified his charges. He understood the “myopia among the Israelis, with their siege mentality,” but had no patience with Israel’s American supporters, “who, by underwriting intransigence, are encouraging Israel on a course which must lead
toward her destruction.” Congress did not escape reproach: “So completely have the majority of our officeholders fallen under Israeli domination that . . . they deny the legitimacy of Palestinian national feelings.” Neither Israel’s “uncritical supporters in our Congress and in our media . . . appreciated what is at stake,” as well as “the enormous distortion of American interests.” Given how much the United States had done for Israel because it “alone . . . made it possible for Israel to exist as a state, it is not too much to ask in return that Israel give up East Jerusalem and the West Bank.” The Palestinian people had “as much right to a homeland as do the Jewish people.” In a spurious accusation he asserted that the Israeli lobby was ubiquitous: “The Zionists are extremely powerful in this country, especially in the field of communications. The most prestigious newspapers in this country are devoted to this cause, and most of the TV networks are owned by people sympathetic to the same cause.” Educating public opinion would be an “uneven battle,” given “the facilities at the disposal of the Zionists. He suggested that even the American military establishment seemed “deeply devoted to the cause of Israel.”

In 1974 Arkansas’s voters, who generally did not share his interest in foreign affairs, voted overwhelmingly to terminate Fulbright’s thirty-year career in the United States Senate, choosing instead the popular Arkansas governor, Dale Bumpers. Fulbright lost for a myriad of reasons, including his segregationist racial views that galvanized African American voters for Bumpers. As much as a third of the conservative Arkansas electorate disagreed with Fulbright’s stand on the Vietnam War. Many in Arkansas concluded that Fulbright, despite his frequent visits to the state, acted as a national figure, out of touch with the citizens of their rural southern state and unconcerned with their needs. Leaders in the Little Rock Jewish community agreed. In 1973, Rabbi Palnick, at the time that he criticized Fulbright’s Face the Nation comments, noted that he thought Fulbright had abdicated his responsibilities “in the area of local problems.” Palnick, who was openly involved in direct movements against segregation, exemplified a generational shift in southern Jewish civil rights leadership. Fulbright’s liberal voting record in a conservative state, such as his support
Fulbright focused on the Zionist lobby and “Jewish money.” Shortly after Fulbright’s appearance on the 1973 *Face the Nation* program Jewish leaders throughout the country actively solicited candidates to oppose Fulbright in 1974, and they approached Bumpers, who was already considering the race. However, given Fulbright’s political problems in Arkansas, with its small Jewish population centered in Little Rock, it is highly unlikely that their efforts were the basis of Fulbright’s defeat.

*Fulbright the Private Citizen*

Although no longer in public office, Fulbright remained keenly attentive to foreign policy matters, with the Middle East his principal interest. As he continued to write and lecture, the tone of his accusations of undue Jewish and Israeli influence and his pro-Arab leanings became more pronounced. He lobbied in support of Arab nations. He wrote Andrew Young, ambassador to the United Nations during the Carter administration, that his Washington, D. C., law firm was registered to represent Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 1980 Fulbright explained his position in simplified terms for a constituent by writing that “we give unlimited support to Israel . . . because the Jewish community in this country, through its numerous organizations and the devotion of its members, is able to influence the policy of our government.”

For years after leaving office Fulbright continued to criticize his former Senate colleagues for their susceptibility to Israeli influence to the point that Randall Woods, his most recent biographer, maintains that Fulbright became “obsessed with the existence of an extensive Zionist conspiracy that had as its goal the bending of the American political system to Israel’s every whim.” The tone grew more strident as he saw his influence diminish as a private citizen, and he realized that he was at a loss to alter the situation. Despite private talks with some of President Gerald R.
Ford’s advisors, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, he could not persuade them to abandon the customary interim approach for a comprehensive settlement for the region. He blamed the Israeli lobby, “a determined, intelligent minority with large resources.” Meanwhile, “the great majority [were] indifferent and unwilling to inform themselves about these rather complex issues.” He aimed intense criticism at the media, arguing that the “major communications media are strongly oriented to Israel.” The influential *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were singled out as “owned and largely staffed by true friends of the Zionists.” For the few articles critical of Israeli policies, there would “be dozens of articles favorable to Israel.” Fulbright’s overstatements concerning Jewish influence continued. In 1976 he asserted that it was a “simple fact . . . that a clear majority of both Houses of Congress have been vigorously and effectively supported, financially and otherwise, by the Jewish community which they represent.”39 Presidential politics was similarly affected. Referring to the 1980 presidential race between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, he suggested that if a “presidential candidate was willing to take the risk he could find surprising support for a more objective policy in the Middle East, but that is not in the cards at the present.” In fact just 45 percent of Jews voted for Carter, primarily due to the risks they thought he had taken with Israel’s security.40

After returning from a tour of the Middle East in 1975, Fulbright reiterated his concerns about the possibilities of another major Arab-Israeli war. Again he emphasized the need for peace-making efforts. In a memorandum to Ford, he conveyed his sense that the “status quo is not benign,” that it “foster[ed] a steady and accelerating slide toward war.” After meeting with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, whom he described as “moderate and responsible men, united in a consensus for making peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders,” he expressed concern that they might be ousted from power if Arab lands continued to be occupied. He repeated his consternation that the American commitment to Israel was “open-ended . . . providing . . . the means for an Israeli policy” beyond American control.41
When Ford failed to respond with the desired statement, Fulbright sent a copy to Brent Scowcroft, Ford’s National Security Advisor, asking him to convey the message to the president. Two months later he sent a similar message to Kissinger. While he was “well aware” that a statement of urgency on the Middle East situation “may bring on immediate, disagreeable political repercussions,” he was certain that “a positive unequivocal statement by the president that he intends to insist upon a comprehensive statement with appropriate guarantees can have the most beneficial effect upon our economy and upon the confidence of the Europeans and the Japanese in the soundness of our policy.” Israeli security would better be “assured by a comprehensive political settlement than by military means,” that made Israel dependent on the United States. The Ford administration did not take Fulbright’s advice.

After returning from a three-week study tour of the Middle East, Senator Charles H. Percy (R-IL), Fulbright’s successor as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Fulbright that his findings critical of Israeli policies “caused dismay, rage, and anger in the Jewish community throughout the country, and particularly in Illinois.” He concluded reluctantly “that some elements of the American Jewish community are more extreme in their point of view, and unrealistic, than the people of Israel who are actually living there.” This statement underscored existing differences between American and Israeli Jews. Fulbright appreciated Percy’s statements, especially because they were “said by someone who has a history of supporting the Israeli Government.”

Fulbright wrote to Carter shortly before he was inaugurated, encouraging him to put forth a “strong initiative” for peace in the region. Although it is unclear if the memorandum persuaded Carter, Fulbright’s recommendations paralleled the initiatives that Carter revealed just two months after taking office, including a call for self-determination for the Palestinian people. Fulbright accurately predicted the “controversy might indeed be sharp and protracted.” After Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem to offer recognition to Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal
from the Sinai Peninsula, Fulbright advised Carter to “be willing to take responsibility for insisting that Israel accept the principle of withdrawal.” Carter’s attempts to reach a comprehensive strategy would elude him. The most he could obtain would be the Camp David Accords that returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and lessened tensions between that country and Israel.

Fulbright continued to complain that the Israelis and their American supporters had “long taken the position that if you do not do exactly as they wish, you are anti-Israel and anti-Semitic.” He charged that this lobby could “elect or defeat nearly any congressman or senator they wish, with their money and coordinated organizations.” In 1980, after the Senate defeated a bill to censure Israel over Israeli settlements on the West Bank, Fulbright congratulated Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-IL) for voting against a foreign aid bill for Israel, which Fulbright described as Stevenson’s “dedication to the public welfare in spite of the overwhelming subservience of [his] colleagues to a foreign government.”

Assessment

American Jewish groups, including his Arkansas Jewish constituency, resented Fulbright’s constantly expressed disapproval of their lobbying methods on behalf of Israel. Accusations of a vast manipulative impact that American Jewish supporters of Israel had on Congress and American public opinion brought a predictable storm of protest from American Jewish groups. In acknowledging congressional support, AIPAC’s chairman explained that it was “because the members of the House and Senate believe the maintenance of a balance in the Mideast and the maintenance of a strong Israel is in the interests of the United States.” An AIPAC newsletter accused Fulbright of consistent partiality against Israel and its American supporters, as well as unfair censure of his Senate colleagues who supported Israel. In 1974, the Anti-Defamation League released a study reprimanding Fulbright for “false charges that the Israelis control Mideast policy in the Congress,” to the detriment of American national interests.
How credible were Fulbright’s accusations? It is ironic that at the same time that Fulbright became even more outspoken after he left office, the American Jewish community, never monolithic, expanded its own public criticisms of Israel. Jews openly questioned Israeli policy on such issues as the failed incursion into Lebanon in 1982, especially the siege of Beirut. They also opposed Israel’s connections with the apartheid regime in South Africa. Differences had surfaced before, especially when the Likud Party won the 1977 elections, and Menachem Begin, who was determined to retain the lands won in the 1967 war, was appointed prime minister. Many American Jews opposed his claims of sovereignty over what he considered biblical Israel, as well as his extension of settlements into the region. In the 1980s, however, those who criticized these policies, such as the American Jewish Committee, were more united and more willing to voice their criticisms openly. An essential component of the Jewish lobby’s power was dependent on the Jewish community speaking with a common voice. By 1988 three major Jewish organizations, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith, argued that AIPAC’s predictable reactions to events in the Middle East were not always in Israel’s best interest.

The legislative influence of AIPAC and other domestic Jewish lobbying groups is widely recognized. During the period under study, they attracted broad support by framing Middle East issues in terms of the concerns of the United States. This congressional and public support prompted policy makers to consider these political factors. However, to argue that this highly successful lobbying force controlled American policy in the Middle East would be a vast overstatement. Other strategic and economic forces were at work, especially American concerns about the Soviets, as well as access to the vast Arab petroleum reserves.

Fulbright made sweeping charges about American Jewish influence over policy making. Ultimately, however, the White House and the State Department determine the direction of foreign policy. Generally, they pursued a broader approach to global obligations than Congress. Congress’s leverage in support-
ing Israel is through its control over appropriations. But even here the executive branch created a budget to which Congress responded. In the Middle East, American presidential perceptions of Israel as a balancing force against Soviet support for the Arab states, whether or not sound, were a factor that Fulbright dismissed. Fulbright exaggerated as he wrote and spoke about Israeli influence and overlooked instances in which pro-Israeli interests failed to secure the policies they desired as well as instances of conflict between Israeli supporters and American policies. American presidents resisted suggestions that the United States recognize Israeli control of the areas it seized in the 1967 war. Although AIPAC disapproved of Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War because he placed America’s continuing mediating role in the region over advancing Israeli interests, the lobby’s disapproval did not play a role in this process. AIPAC sustained overwhelming defeats when it could not prevent the Carter administration’s sale of advanced F-15 fighter jets or the Reagan administration’s sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplanes to Saudi Arabia. The F-15 fighter sale demonstrated that the Israeli lobby could not overcome the tenacity of a president involved and fully committed, even though AIPAC was determined to expend all resources to prevent a sale. The AWACS case illustrated the leverage of a newly-elected popular president and the influence of oil and aerospace interests. Ultimately it was the foreign policy leadership’s perceptions of American interests, while cognizant of domestic politics, that determined America’s diplomatic and foreign aid decisions.50

In Arkansas, despite the organized Jewish community in Little Rock, Jews had little if any influence over their junior United States senator on Israeli issues. Fulbright was too independent and the community was too small for them to persuade Fulbright.


20 Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington, IN, 1982), ix.


38 Fulbright to Andrew Young, series 2, box 15, folder 3, Middle East, 1977; Fulbright to Hervey W. Herron, November 12, 1980, series 2, box 16, folder 1, Fulbright Papers; Bard, *The Water’s Edge*, 18.


40 Fulbright to Sir Geoffrey Arthur, October 30, 1980, series 2, box 16, folder 1, Fulbright Papers; Goldberg, *Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups*, 62.


43 Charles Percy to Fulbright, February 5, 1975, and Fulbright to Percy, February 13, 1975, series 2, box 15, folder 1, Fulbright Papers.


46 Fulbright to Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III, June 19, 1980, series 2, box 16, folder 1, Fulbright Papers.

